Let me see if I've got this straight:

We're *seriously* going to stop fighting once the Chinese establish a beachhead on Taiwan, because we don't dare risk a thousand casualties... and let every other nation on the planet, including our NATO partners, including ANZAC, including the Japanese, know that the treaties we've signed with them aren't worth spit if a determined enemy ever successfully puts their boots on their turf?

We are going to sit back and watch a big police gobble up the small prosperous democracy next door, with whom we have had an iron-clad security arrangement for the previous thirty years, because we shrink from face to face violence with the mighty Chinese army...? which, by the way, still needs food and fuel and ammo once they *get* there, and must ship it over in the teeth of a highly indignant USN and Air Force?

The President (whoever he is) is liable to think that losing a war to a Communist dictatorship, leaving them emboldened and their neighbors scared spitless, is MORE politically desirable than sending in the Marines and living with the resultant body count?

The assumptions that underlie this whole scenario is prime facie absurd. This guy is full of crap. I don't care *who* he used to work for.

Jay,

I suggest you re-read the article, because you've completely missed an important point.

The scenario discussed in that section is a surprise invasion (unlikely, IMO, but possible.)

In that case, we'd be sending Marines in against entrenched Chinese troops -- and we won't do it.

Fact is, we probably can't do it.

Right now, we can only land one division of Marines by force. Before reinforcements could come, they would have to seize an enemy-held port and several airfields.

Meanwhile, the propaganda war would continue. The Chinese would claim, "We are reunited with our brothers. The Americans are causing useless destruction and loss of lives."

And, the sad fact is, we would probably cave under those circumstances.

Stephen, permit me to throw a few things out.

I read Mr. Sen's article. He didn't mention anything about the PLAN amphibious capability. It's estimated the PLAN presently has approx. 15 amphibious ships of various sizes, maybe enough to transport and land an infantry division. Any additional troops are going to have to come over the old-fashioned way (via ship to a point near the beach, and transfer into small boats for landing). Could be Korea again with the sheer numbers of Chinese masses (and losses). Despite what one of Mr. Sen's commentators noted about PLA discipline, that's only good if they can make it to the beach and their command structure is intact.

Unless they get sufficient boots on the island, the Tawianese can slow them down. Yes, paratroopers can be dropped and the PLA/PLAN have commando forces, but unless they really disrupt things, I figure the Taiwanese have defense plans in place, to buy time if nothing else.

Second, while Mr. Sen mentioned there are no carriers, and that PLA aircraft will be facing long transit times between their bases and Taiwan, the PLAN has been working on that.

The Chinese acquired the ex-Russian carrier Varyag, possibly as a training platform, for study if nothing else. The PLA also reportedly have an airstrip in a carrier-configuration. I suspect, for expediency's sake, any PLAN carriers that are built will be used as mobile airstrips for rearming and refueling rather than having embarked aircraft.

I won't delve into the political aspects. That's not my forte. However I will venture the idea that "caving". is going to depend on who holds the reins in D.C.

Hi there, thanks all for reading my article. I don't often update my blog due to other commitments, but thought the military side of the Taiwan issue was one worth looking into.

Jay, full of crap I may be, but never forget that Asian opponents have given the US a very bloody nose in WWII, more so in Korea and even more so in Vietnam. I don't honestly think that any US president is going to risk the huge bodycount that fighting a ground campaign against the Chinese would mean. Force multipliers are fine in naval and air warfare, but not that great when boots are getting dirty. Thanks to Stephen for supporting my argument on that one.

It is true that I haven't worked for Jane's for a couple of years, and PA rightly points out an oversight since I didn't mention airborne forces. I think PLA paratroopers could do some serious damage, but once the USN and USAF cut off their supply route they are in serious trouble. I considered amphibious forces in general under my naval paragraph but didn't make any specific reference.

As for the Varyag, it's not only obsolete but the last I heard of it it had rusted up in the Bosphorus for a couple of years before being towed to Macao for use as a novelty casino. I seriously doubt that Chinese engineers are going to be able to get much useful info out of it. There are numerous rumours about carriers being built in China but remember that it takes years to build one.

Thanks again for reading.

Does anyone understand the affect on commercial shipping that an attack on Taiwan would engender?

China is a growing oil importer and manufactured exporter. Will those ships sail if Taiwan is attacked? If the USN is attacked?

Will a population with rising economic expectations see continued economic prosperity after such an event?

When the Chinese were poor with little to lose they were more serious threat. With a rising middle class and lots to lose, they join us in an interdependent world.

Conquered people do not fit in a market economy.

I agree that a prosperous China would have much more to lose if it went to war over Taiwan.
However, if the Chinese Communist party felt that its power was slipping, with ethnic unrest in the east, tens of millions of restless single men (thanks to a one child policy & a preference for sons) and greater internal calls for democracy, then, hey we're in the midst of a patriotic war to unite all the Chinese people.

PS
thanks for tha analysis Phil.

I'll just give a thumbnail sketch of my comments over at Phil's site. Basically, if the PLA gets a beachhead on Taiwan, they will have to resupply and reinforce their troops, and that will be exceedingly difficult given our naval and air superiority. The PLA troops on the ground would be starved, out of ammunition, and attrited down to the nubs in just a relatively short time. All without us having to land a single Marine. There is no Ho Chi Minh trail that leads to Taiwan, supplies would have to come by sea or air. That makes them vulnerable to attack.

Another thing that is a possible (and very powerful) political tool is to declare a maritime exclusion zone all around mainland China, warning that *ALL* ships caught in the zone, no matter their nationality, are subject to being sunk without warning. Without oil or money coming into the country, the PRC would have a very tough time maintaining any kind of serious operational tempo.

They can't go nuclear, as they know they have much more to lose. We've dropped 'em before, and will do so again if someone does it to us. They know we can flatten all of their population centers, while at best they can hit Alaska, the Northwest, and Hawaii.

Addressing the posts above and on the original post - it's a fair point about the supply lines, but I'm still fairly convinced that the Taiwanese army wouldn't put up much of a fight especially if they were left on their own for a while.

Once the PLA have dug in and established themselves they would be extremely difficult to remove. They'd be able to obtain supplies through the many sympathisers in Taiwan itself, and they'd be able to loot the Taiwanese army's supplies.

Never forget that is was Mao Zedong who applied Sun Tzu's theories to create the model for modern guerrilla warfare, something the US has shown itself conspicuously unable to manage in Vietnam and Iraq. Guerilla war in the urban jungles of Taiwan would be an incredibly erosive business on any US ground forces engaged, and bodybags don't vote.

As for the dogmatism point, yes, but it's nothing to do with communism. These boys, ill trained and inflexible as they are, are actually truly motivated and believe in a united China. It's nationalism, not Maoism. It's also a question of losing face. I've been in the PRC a while and think I have an insight - they'd be hard to beat once they got a foothold.

As for a watertight economic blockade of China, this would push every other country in the region into deep recession and no doubt kick off lots more regional instability, which the US would end up having to manage. I'm sure North Korea wouldn't be too happy, for one.

Interesting debate - obviously I and no-one else can know everything, it's all opinion. Let's hope none of us are ever proved right or wrong.

This scenario certainly suggests that it would be a good idea to permanently task at least a couple of carrier groups in this area, along with a substantial number of attack submarines--and a Trident sub or two to make sure that a first strike option is open should the Chinese start making noise about nuking Hawaii, Alaska, and LA.

I agree with Mr. Sen that PLA paratroopers and commandos can do a lot of damage. The PLA, in fact, has raised several more special-ops units in recent years (some possibly in the police forces). They've also had a lot of practice over the past 20 years.

The last voyage of the Varyag is a saga in itself. It never made it to Macao; its owners lost out on the licensing auction. However, I wouldn't discount its use as an engineering reference.

No doubt the French will be happy to assist any future carrier construction, especially if the joint UK/French CV project gets going.

As for being proved right or wrong, I'm cynical on that point. But hopefully I'll be a tottering old man should it happen.

Stephen, if you're right, and we can't/won't send in the Marines, the 101st Airborne, the California National Guard, and whoever else to punt the PLA out of Taiwan once they get there, then -- allow me to repeat myself:

NATO is not worth diddly. Think about that for a minute. Our treaties with Japan are not worth diddly. The ANZUS treaty is not worth diddly. Think about what that means to us and them and the world in general.

A Chinese victory in Taiwan will leave a militaristic, nationalistic China eager to flex its muscles all over the Pacific rim, while our standing is reduced to ashes. Think about that too. This is what any President will have to consider. It is not about a couple of hundred casualties versus a thousand; those estimates are IMHO impossibly low anyway.

These stakes are economic and political, and they are colossal. This is real life, guys, not a freaking wargame where if the PLA player gets enough troops over to Taiwan in time he 'wins.'

Under these circumstances, and with those stakes, it is absolutely inconcievable to me that any administration would ever 'cave'.If we have to bomb the bajeezus out of them for two months before we go in a la Desert Storm, we can certainly do so.

I suggest you think very, very carefully about the ramifications of what you're saying. You've written eloquently and with great force about why we can't afford to go belly-up in Iraq. I suggest you apply the same criterion to Taiwan -- which is, after all, already a prosperous and healthy democracy.

Let us also not forget the example of Argentina in the early 80's. They had massive economic and political problems, too. Their ruling junta thought a war to regain control over some islands they thought were theirs would be the perfect solution. Result: The Argentines got their butts whipped, and the populace showed their discontent by taking to the streets. Within two years, the junta was out of power. The quickest way for any regieme to lose power is to start a war and screw it up.

Very interesting discussion, all!